The Equity Premium Implied by Production by Urban J. Jermann
The equity premium implied by production
Urban J. Jermann
The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and NBER
Incomplete version - Not for circulation
January 31, 2005
Abstract
We study the implications of producers’ ﬁrst-order conditions for the link between invest-
ment and aggregate asset prices. Calibrated to the U.S. postwar economy, the model can
generate a sizeable equity premium, with reasonable volatility for market returns and risk free
rates. The market’s Sharpe ratio and the market price of risk are very volatile. Contrary
to most models, our model generates a negative correlation between conditional means and
standard deviations of excess returns.
Twenty years after Mehra and Prescott’s paper on the equity premium puzzle there is still
no widely accepted replacement for the standard time-separable utility speciﬁcation. Clearly,
representing consumer and investor preferences, as well as interpreting consumption data has
turned out to be a very diﬃcult task. Contrary to the consumption side, the production side of
asset pricing has received considerably less attention. Focusing on the production side shifts the
burden towards representing production technologies and interpreting production data. While a
number of asset pricing studies have considered nontrivial production sectors, these have generally
been studied jointly with some speciﬁc preference speciﬁcation. Thus, the analysis could not
escape the constraints imposed by the preference side. A pure production asset pricing literature
has emerged from the Q-theory of investment. However, typically, these studies focus on the link
between investment and realized stock returns. We are not aware of any study that has explicitly
determined the equity premium independently from the consumption side. This is the object of
our analysis.
In this paper we are interested in studying the macroeconomic determinants of asset prices
given by a multi-input aggregate production technology. We focus exclusively on the producers’
ﬁrst-order conditions that link production variables and state-prices, with sectoral investment
playing a crucial role. We are interested in two sets of questions. First: what properties of
investment and production technologies are important for the ﬁrst and second moments of risk
free rates and aggregate equity returns? Second: does a model plausibly calibrated to the U.S.
1economy have the ability to replicate ﬁrst and second moments of risk free rates and aggregate
equity returns?
The work most closely related to ours is Cochrane’s work on production based asset pricing
(1988, 1991). Some of the features that diﬀerentiate our work are that we focus explicitly on
the equity premium, we use more general functional forms for adjustment cost, and we base
our empirical evaluation on the two main sectoral aggregates of U.S. capital investment, namely
equipment & software as well as structures.
We consider the problem of a representative producer that selects multiple ﬁxed input factors.
In order to be able to pin down the state-price process, this problem needs to have two related
properties. First, markets need to be complete and the producer has to face a full set of state-
prices. Second, there needs to be as many predetermined state variables (ﬁxed production factors)
as there are states of nature. This assumption of “complete technologies” is necessary in order to
be able to read oﬀ the full set of state-contingent prices from the production side. In most studies
with nontrivial production sectors this property is not satisﬁed; of course, in a general equilibrium
environment it doesn’t usually play an important role.
We calibrate our model to a two-sector representation. We use U.S. data on investment for
equipment and software, as well as for structures. This sectoral representation is convenient
because these two sectors have natural asymmetries. Indeed, we use the plausible assumption that
the capital stock for structures is more diﬃcult to adjust than for equipment and software. As
becomes clear below, asymmetries across sectors are needed if we want to derive well-behaved—that
is positive—state prices.
We characterize sectoral asymmetries that ensure that state-prices are positive and that gen-
erate positive and sizeable equity premium. Our key quantitative ﬁndings are the following. For
unconditional moments, we can plausibly generate an equity premium of several percentage points
with risk free rates having a reasonable mean and volatility. For conditional moments, the ex-
pected excess equity return is quite volatile, usually more volatile than the risk free rate. Also
concerning excess returns, the correlation between conditional means and volatilities is negative.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we present the model and in section 2 the
main asset pricing elements. Section 3 introduces functional forms. In section 4 we analyze the
theoretical links between asset prices and production data. Section 5 contains our calibration and
Section 6 the quantitative analysis.
21 Model
The model represents the producer’s choice of capital inputs for a given state price process.
Key ingredients are capital adjustment cost and stochastic productivity.
Assume an environment where uncertainty is modelled as the realization of s,o n eo u to fa
ﬁnite set S =( s1,s2,...sN),w i t hst the current period realization and st ≡ (s0,s 1,...s t) the history
up to and including t. Probabilities of st are denoted by π
¡
st¢














st introduces possible stochastic technology in the production of the ﬁnal good, Kj the j-th capital














where δj is the depreciation rate and Zj
¡
st¢
is the (stochastic) technology for producing capital













This speciﬁcation will be further specialized below to allow for capital stocks to exhibit some form
of balanced growth.
































































with s0 and Kj (s−1) given and P (s0)=1 , without loss of generality. The scaling of the
multipliers is chosen so that we get intuitive values. Indeed, q represents the marginal value of
one unit of installed capital in terms of current period numeraire; in equilibrium it is also the cost
of installing one unit of capital including adjustment cost. Note that if Z has a growth trend, as
seems to be required by US data on equipment and software, then q in this sector will be trending
down—reﬂecting the fact that equipment and software become cheaper over time. Also note that
q is not the ratio of the market value over the book value of capital (in units of the ﬁnal good),
but qZ is. Indeed, the market value of the ﬁrm (assuming one capital stock) is qK.H o w e v e r ,t h e
book value (or replacement cost) of the capital stock is K/Z,w h e r eK is number of units of the
capital good and 1/Z = pI the price/value of a unit of capital in terms of the ﬁnal good. For
equipment, this price pI,a sw e l la sq, will be downward trending, while qZ doesn’t trend.

















































































































Hj,2 (Kj (st−1),I j (st),Z j (st))
#
,
for each j, where the notation P
¡
st+1|st¢
shows the price of the numeraire in st+1 conditional





















is the return we
get in st+1 from adding one (marginal) unit of capital of type j in state st.T h eﬁrst-order condition
shows that in equilibrium adding one marginal unit of a given type of capital produces a change
in the proﬁt plan that is worth one unit.
We will specialize the model to have 2 capital inputs and 2 states of nature in each period. In
addition to complete markets, that is the producers ability to sell contingent output for each state
of nature, we also need to satisfy the requirement of “complete technologies”, that is the ability to
move resources independently between all states of nature. The complete technology requirement
is needed if we want to be able to recover all state prices from the producers ﬁrst-order conditions.
2 From investment returns to state prices















































4Clearly, it isn’t necessarily the case that this matrix inversion is feasible nor that state prices are
necessarily positive. In particular, as further discussed below, the requirement for positive state
prices forces us to rule our certain parameterizations.













It is easy to check the matrix algebra to see that if for one of the investment returns the realized









, then, as is implied by no-arbitrage, it equals






. The close relationship between risk free rates and expected
returns to the capital stocks can be illustrated in the following case. Without loss of generality,










































Of course, ε0s could be positive of negative, and ¯ Rj
¡
st¢
is not necessarily the (probability weighted)
















ε2 (st) − ε1 (st)
,
















That is to say that if the average realized returns are equal for both capital stocks, then this
average return also equals the risk free rate.






























is the state-contingent probability vector. Note, so far, we had not needed
any probabilities. The aggregate equity return [XXX introduce some notation that makes
clear this is the market return with dividends etcXXX] (the return to the representative ﬁrm)
can be obtained as the value weighted average of the individual returns—given the homogeneity




























5While the two capital stocks will usually grow at diﬀerent rates, the value share of each capital
stock may still be stationary because the q0s can be trending too. This is typically implied by the
growth restriction discussed below. Alternatively, the aggregate return can be nonstationary even
with stationary state prices.
The highest sharpe rate (market price of risk) also has a simple expression. Starting from state
prices we introduce the stochastic discount factor m
¡
st+1|st¢























































In this section, we present the functional forms and the simulation strategies.
A. The production function




















which we restrict further below to accommodate balanced growth.
B. The investment cost function
We will use the following speciﬁcation
H (K,I,Z)=H (K/Z,I)=H (1,ZI/K) · (K/Z)







· λZj (st),w i t hλZj (st) following a two-state Markov process.1
The functional form is assumed to be








1Given the capital accumulation equation, and as we further discuss below, IZ and K are cointegrated, and so
are I and K/Z.
6with b,c > 0, v>1 and ZI/K ≥ 0.2
As can easily seen, this function is (1) convex in I for v>1. (2) adjustment cost and the
direct cost for additional capital goods are separable, trivially so because H (1,ZI/K) · (K/Z)=
[H (1,ZI/K) − ZI/K + ZI/K] · (K/Z)=[ H (1,ZI/K) − ZI/K] · (K/Z)+I ≡ C (1,ZI/K) ·
(K/Z)+I.A n dw ei m p o s et h a tC (1,ZI/K) ≥ 0—that is, the pure adjustment cost is nonnegative.
The diﬀerent parameters have roughly the following functions. v determines the cost of choos-
ing volatile production investment plans. For a given investment process, it determines the volatil-
ity of the market price of capital. The parameters b and c are used to obtain target average values
for the average qZ (marginal cost) and for the total cost.
With this speciﬁcation, we have the marginal cost given as
HI (K,I,Z)=H2 (1,ZI/K)=b(ZI/K)
ν−1
and we can easily check convexity with respect to investment
HII (K,I,Z)=b(v − 1)(ZI/K)
ν−2 (Z/K) > 0 for b>0 and v>1.
The case of no-adjustment cost is given by setting v = b =1 , c =0 ,s ot h a t
H (1,ZI/K) · (K/Z)=I.
From the ﬁrst-order condition we obtain a relationship between the investment rate and the
marginal cost of capital
qZ = HI (K,I,Z)=b(ZI/K)
ν−1 .





= v − 1.
C. Stationarity of returns and simulation strategy
We want returns to be stationary. This imposes some restrictions on technologies and the
growth processes. We also describe here the state space used for our simulations. Consider the




























2In order to allow for ZI/K < 0,w ec a ni n t r o d u c eac o ﬃcient d such that H (1,ZI/K)=
b
v (ZI/K + d)
v + c.
For our empirical implementations this has not been useful sofar.
7where we have used a more compact notation. The ﬁrst term represents the marginal product,
the second the adjustment cost reduction next period (growth option) and the third, the leftover



























to be stationary is that each of the 3 diﬀerent
composite variables is stationary. Let us consider each of these terms separately.
First, Zj,t+1/Zj,t, as seen above, is stationary by assumption. Second, given the speciﬁcation of
the productivity growth rates as ﬁnite elements Markov chains, and assuming that sectoral invest-








it can easily be shown that for appropriate starting points, ZjtIj,t/Kj,t is bounded. Third, we will







This assumption guarantees stationarity and allows us to focus our analysis on investment dynam-
ics. The implication of this assumption is that to the extent that capital gets cheaper to produce
over time, that is as Zj increases, it also becomes less productive at the margin in physical terms,
so that in value terms, the marginal product remains constant.3
Stationarity of sectoral investment returns is not suﬃcient for stationarity of aggregate asset
returns. Indeed, as shown in equation, the aggregate return equals a weighted average of the




















As u ﬃcient (and necessary) condition for stationarity, given our previous assumptions, is that
K1,t+1/Z1,t and K2,t+1/Z2,t are cointegrated. Given that the investment capital ratios ZjtIj,t/Kj,t
are stationary, this is equivalent to I1,t and I2,t being cointegrated. Setting investment expendi-
ture growth rates equal across sectors, that is λI1 (st+1)=λI2 (st+1), guarantees that I1,t and I2,t
are cointegrated. To summarize, because individual quantities have stochastic trends, we end up
choosing identical investment expenditure growth realizations across sectors to guarantee station-
arity of aggregate equity returns. However, we are free to choose the realizations for λZ1
t and λZ2
t
independently. This is less restrictive than it might appear for several reasons. As seen above,
3This is related to one of the properties implied by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell’s balanced growth path.
8what matters for the investment returns is the behavior of the product λI1
t λZ1
t and not λI1
t indi-
vidually. That is to say that the important element in the calibration is to ﬁt the process of real
investment growth rather than the growth in investment expenditure. Moreover, for our empirical
counterparts, as shown below, the historical volatilities of λI1and λI2 are nearly identical, and
realizations of the two growth rates are strongly positively correlated. Alternatively, we could
introduce additional components for each process that have purely transitory eﬀects and would
thus not need to be restricted to ensure balanced growth. However, given the requirement to
keep the number of states small, the additional ﬂexibility introduced in this way would be rather
limited































































for j =1 ,2.
Indeed, returns are function of state variables and shock realizations. Seven variables are a suﬃ-



















.C l e a r l yKj
¡
st¢
matters too, but it is a function of the state variables. The proba-
bility distribution of the shocks is summarized by st, the realization of the return does not depend






























for j =1 ,2.









=1 ,a n dK1
¡
s−1¢
is set equal to
the historical average of the ratio of the value of capital in this sector relative to the other sector.
Initial investment levels are set at their implied steady state values.
94 What determines the equity premium?
Here we examine the model elements that are key in generating a positive equity premium.
We also discuss the properties needed to guarantee that in our simulations state prices are always
positive, given the processes for investment and productivity. In this analysis we focus on the
ability of sectoral diﬀerences in adjustment cost parameters vj, and depreciation rates δj to deliver
interesting properties. This focus is guided by the fact that for these two parameters, diﬀerences
are ﬁrst-order given the chosen sectoral calibration with equipment & software on one side and
structures on the other. We examine additional asymmetries in our quantitative evaluation. The
main ﬁndings of this section is that the asymmetry in the adjustment cost parameter v is crucial
to generate a positive equity premium and to guarantee positive state prices. Sectoral diﬀerences
in depreciation rates seem less important.


















1 (st,s1) − RI
2 (st,s1)
. (4.1)
We start with some basic properties of the model:
1. As is clear from equation 4.1, each capital stock has to do (absolutely) better in one speciﬁc
state. If it weren’t the case, then one of the derived state prices would be negative, which
is inconsistent with equilibrium. Indeed, if one type of investment were to generate a higher
return in both states, then resource would be moved into this type of capital from the other.
2. If more of a given type of investment is added, its (marginal) return goes down. This is
because installation costs increase due to the assumption of convex adjustment cost.4 In
case the marginal product has decreasing returns, there is an additional eﬀect that generates
diminishing returns.
3. As is clear from equation 4.1, the state with the higher price has less dispersed returns.
Assume that from a relative price of one, the price of one state increases. Capital is then
allocated to the sector that has an absolute advantage in this state from the other sector. By
doing this, the higher return capital lowers its return and the lower return capital increases
its return. Both of these contribute to lowering the dispersion in the considered state.
To focus on risk premiums, the price ratio has to be compared to the ratio of the probabilities.
Given that a reasonable empirical speciﬁcation is not far from iid we consider here the case where
4Moreover, next periods capital stock is larger leading to a reduction in the investment capital ratio and thus a
reduction of the value of the having installed capital and also a reduction in the value attached to growth option,
as can easily be seen.
10π(.,s1)













Without loss of generality, we take state 2 to be the high growth state. State 2, is then also the
state where realized returns are higher. This is because with convex adjustment cost, installed
capital has become more valuable. Therefore to have a positive equity premium, the relative price
of a state 2 payout has to be low, this is achieved by having high dispersion in state 2. That is to
say, to have a positive equity premium, the high growth states needs to generate more dispersed
returns than the low growth state.
We now examine which parameter conﬁgurations can contribute to a positive equity premium
and generate positive state prices. We focus on diﬀerences across sectors in the adjustment cost
curvature and the depreciation rates—everything else being symmetric across the two sectors. For
this analysis we consider a second-order Taylor approximation of the investment return at the
steady-state around the mean of investment growth. We assume that only investment expenditure
growth is allowed to vary, but not the marginal product nor investment speciﬁc technology shock.






















A second-order Taylor approximation is obtained by assuming that all investment capital
ratios are at their steady state values ZIj/Kj = Z0I0
j/K0




















λ0 − ¯ λ
0´
,w i t h¯ λ
0 the center point of the approximation, here the mean, ¯ R a constant
given below, and











λIλZ (v − 1)
2 − (1 − δ)(v − 1)
o
.
Because we have already assumed iid shocks, the size of the up and down deviations from the
mean in a two-state setting are identical, that is, we have
∆λj (s2)=−∆λj (s1) ≡ ∆λj,f o re a c hj ∈ (1,2),
moreover, assuming equal investment growth volatility in the two sectors, we have
∆λ1 = ∆λ2 = ∆λ.





2 (.,s2) − RI
1 (.,s2)
RI
1 (.,s1) − RI
2 (.,s1)
=
[C2 − C1]∆λ +
h¡ ¯ R2 − ¯ R1
¢
+ 1




[C2 − C1]∆λ −
h¡ ¯ R2 − ¯ R1
¢
+ 1






CC + BB + o(.)
CC − BB + o(.)
A ss h o w nb ye q u a t i o n4 . 2 ,i no r d e rt oh a v ep o s i t i v ep r i c e s ,w en e e dCC >> 0 or << 0.
CC needs to be suﬃciently fare away from 0 so that despite the dispersion induced by BB,t h e
numerator and the denominator always have the same sign. Moreover, CC should not be too
sensitive to the state of the economy, to ensure that this property is satisﬁed everywhere. For a
positive equity premium, if CC > 0, we need BB > 0, so that the price of the low state, that is
state 1, is higher (mutatis mutandum for CC < 0).
We will now check the conditions on v and δ needed to generate these properties. In our
calibration we will have equipment and software as sector 1 and structures as sector 2. Our
calibration will be one where structures depreciate less and are more costly to install, that is,
δ2 < δ1 and that v2 >v 1.
Positive prices. With equally volatile investment growth across sectors we need to check
what type of asymmetry has the ability to generate positive prices. Given
C = v − 1,
clearly, asymmetry in v is needed. Moreover, the level of δ has no eﬀect.
Positive equity premium. Given that CC > 0,i fB2 >B 1and ¯ R2 > ¯ R1, then the equity
premium is positive. Thus we check if our speciﬁcation of the asymmetry for δ and v contributes
to this outcome. Remember, in our calibration, δ2 < δ1 and v2 >v 1; and let us therefore consider
























[(v − 1)((λIλZ − 1) + δ)+( v − 2)(1 − δ)]




















λIλZ (v − 1)










· [2λIλZ (v − 1) − (1 − δ)]
12if v>
£1













¶2 v − 1
λZ
> 0 ,i fv>1.
Given the signs of the derivatives, the asymmetry in v helps generate a positive equity premium,
while the asymmetry in δ does not. What about quantitative importance of the two opposing
eﬀects? The following example shows that moving v from 2 to 5 is quantitatively more important
than moving δ between .05 and .15. Indeed, ∂B
∂δ ∆δ =( v − 1).1=.2,(i fv =3 ), while ∂B
∂v ∆v ≈
[3]3 = 9. Thus, we conclude that the selected asymmetry should contributed positively to the
equity premium.
In our calibration we set ¯ R2 and ¯ R1 independently from other parameters. As discuss below,
this implicitly consists in picking values of Aj so that target values of ¯ Rj are achieved. Given the
limited amount of direct information about Aj, we choose this approach.Alternatively, we could
set Aj at some given value, and then let ¯ R2 be determined endogenously. In this case, an analysis
l i k et h eo n ep e r f o r m e dh e r ef o rB can be carried out assuming that Aj are equal across sectors.
5 Calibration
The majority of the parameter values are picked to be consistent with quantity data alone,
without including any information from asset prices. For the rest of the parameters, asset pricing
moments are used for calibration. We ﬁrst present a short summary of our baseline calibration,
details are provided thereafter.
A. Summary
The table lists the parameters to calibrate and the chosen baseline values:































δe,δs =[ 0 .112,0.031]
(Ke/Ze)/(Ks/Zs)=0 .6
νe =2 .5,νs =4 .5,b e,b s,c e,c s : qss =1 .5
A1,A 2 : so that Rss =1 .021
13ρ and fr are the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation and the frequency of realizations that are below





, (δe,δs), (Ke/Ze)/(Ks/Zs). For the baseline calibra-
tion, the variance of the investment speciﬁc productivity shocks is set to zero, we present results
with non-zero variance below. In order to replicate steady-state values for q,w ep i c k(be,b s),w i t h
the lowest possible cost, which determines (ce,c s). For the curvature parameters, based on casual
empiricism, we assume: νe < νs; with the exact values picked to maximize the model’s ﬁt. Finally,
A1,a n dA2 are picked to minimize the impact of hard to measure quantities and to help the model.
B. Details of diﬀerent parts of calibration
(i) Investment and productivity processes We consider the empirical counterparts of three quan-
tities
I · Z ≡ Investment ( addition to capital stock in units of capital good)
I ≡ Investment expenditure in units of numeraire ﬁnal good (consumption)
Z ≡ Investment-speciﬁc technological change
1/Z = pI = PI/PC : Replacement cost (not including adj. cost) for capital, also bookvalue.
We will use the following time series: the quantity index of investment in each sector to give
us IZ, the deﬂator of investment goods and the deﬂator of nondurables and services to jointly
give us Z for each sector. We use annual data for these 3 series, for equipment and structures,
covering 1947-2003.
The calibration of the investment growth process is in two steps. First, the probability matrix
is determined to match the serial correlation and the frequency of low and high growth states.
These two moments do not depend on the shock values themselves but only on the probabilities.








where ρ ≡ autocorelation and fr ≡ p1/p2, that is the relative frequency of state 1 (the recession
state). For the relative frequency we have counted the number of realizations of investment
growth below its mean: there are 26/56 for equipment and 27/56 for structures. This gives a
relative frequency for recessions compared to expansions of .9 (assuming 26.5/56 recessions). The
ﬁrst order serial correlations of the growth rates of investment are 0.13 and 0.28,respectively. The
common ρ is set at the average of 0.2.
Second, we select 6 values for the realized growth rates of investment expenditure and the sector
speciﬁc technological progress. As discussed above, equal growth realizations for λI are required
14for balanced growth, but given that λI does not enter any formula alone, this isn’t a major
constraint. The 6 values are picked to match a weighted average of the empirical counterparts of
the means and variances for IjZj and Zj. This represents a total of 8 moments. Historical means
and standard deviations equal
µIZe − 1=5 .71% σIZe =7 .81%
µIZs − 1=2 .29% σIZs =6 .86%
µZe − 1=1 .82% σZe =2 .56%
µZs − 1=−0.44% σZs =2 .35%.
With transparency in mind, we chose a baseline calibration that eliminates all asymmetries that
are not crucial. In particular, for investment, we set the mean and the standard deviation in both
sectors at the average across sectors, so that the model counterparts are µIZe = µIZs =1 .04,a n d
σIZe = σIZs =0 .0733. Means and standard deviations for the investment speciﬁc technological
change are set at µZe = µZs =1 .0069,a n dσZe = σZs =0 . In this case, all moments can
be matched with the values given in the table above. Given that we are limited to a two-state
representation, investment growth rates in the model are perfectly correlated; the correlation
between the empirical counterparts is 0.6.
We also present results for a calibration that seeks to match as closely as possible the 8
means and standard deviations above. We minimize the equally weighted average of the squared
deviations of the model’s moments from their empirical counterparts. As shown in the appendix,
this can be done reasonably well. The empirical correlations of sectoral investment with its speciﬁc
technological growth are 0.43 and −0.32, while the correlations of the technological growth across
sectors is 0.3. Clearly, due the limited degrees of freedom in our two state process we cannot
match all these moments. As we show below, for most quantities of interest, this consideration is
quantitatively second order.
(ii) Depreciation rates We need the constant depreciation rates for equipment and software as
well as for structures: (δe,δs). We can directly compute depreciation rates from the Fixed Assets
tables, and take the mean. We get 13.06% and 2.7% for 1947-2002. Because NIPA’s depreciation
includes physical wear as well as economic obsolesence, we adjust the data to take into account
that the model depreciation covers only physical depreciation. To do this we add the price increase




+ pI,t/pI,t−1 − 1=
Dt
Kt
+( Zt−1/Zt − 1),
15with Dt depreciation according to NIPA. This adjustment decreases depreciation by 1.82% for
equipment and -0.44% for structures.
(iii) Relative size of capital stocks The ratio of the capital stocks, (Ke,t/Ze,t)/(Ks,t/Zs,t),i s
needed only for computing aggregate returns, which, as we have seen, are a function of the
price weighted sum of the of the two capital stocks. In the model, the ratio of the physi-
cal capital stocks Ke,t/Ks,t is trending, while the ratio of the bookvalues of the capital stocks
(in terms of the consumption good) (Ke,t/Ze,t)/(Ks,t/Zs,t)is not trending. For calibration, we
will have the ratio of bookvalues replicating roughly the average of the historical values. This
will be implemented in the following way. We normalize Ze,0 = Zs,0 = Ks,0 =1 ,a n ds e t
Ke,0 = mean((Ke,t/Ze,t)/(Ks,t/Zs,t)) · (Ks,0/Zs,0)/Ze,0 = mean((Ke,t/Ze,t)/(Ks,t/Zs,t)).
We use Current-Cost Net Stocks of Fixed Assets from the BEA. With this data, for the period
1947-2002, mean((Ke,t/Ze,t)/(Ks,t/Zs,t)) = 0.6. This is to say that the value of equipment is 0.6
of the value of structures.
(iv) Adjustment cost and marginal product To parameterize the adjustment cost function, we
choose the following procedure sequentially:
1) Pick v to get good results for asset prices under the restriction that νe < νs. Speciﬁcally,
the selected values roughly generate the highest equity premium with the lowest (reasonable)
return volatility, by also guaranteeing positive state prices. More formal searches have selected
very similar parameter combinations.
2) Pick b so that qZ0s are consistent with average values reported in the literature.
3) c is then picked to minimize the overall amount of output lost due to adjustment cost.
In addition, to casual empiricism, there is also other evidence that suggests that adjustment
costs are larger for structures than for equipment and software. In particular, the fact that the
serial correlation of the growth rates is somewhat higher for structures than for equipment can
be interpreted as an expression of the desire to smooth investment over time due to the relatively
high adjustment cost.
There are many examples of studies that estimate qZ. Lindenberg and Ross (1981) report
averages for two-digit sectors for the period 1960-77 between .85 and 3.08. Lewellen and Badrinath
(1997) report an average of 1.4 across all sectors for the period 1975-91, Gomes (1999) reports an
average of 1.56. Based on this we will use a steady-state target value for qZ of 1.5 for both sectors.
One problem with using empirical studies to infer about the required heterogeneity in the sectoral
costs is that most studies consider adjustment costs by sector of activity. For our analysis, we
would need information about the adjustment cost by type of capital for a representative ﬁrm.
16The marginal product coeﬃcients A1 and A2 are set implicitly so as to have the steady-state
return Rss g i v e nb ye q u a t i o n?? equalized in the two sectors and to replicate the mean risk free
rate.
(iv).1 Calibrate b and c to ﬁt target qZ at steady state I/(K/Z). From the capital accumulation
equation we have
IZ/K = K0/K − (1 − δ),
For a deterministic steady-state, the growth rate of capital equals the growth rate of investment.






w h e r ew eu s et h em e a no fλIλZ implied by the model as the empirical counterpart for λIλZ,a n d













Finally, we set c so that, roughly speaking, the total cost is minimized. The total cost is
increasing in c, so we will pick the lowest possible c. This is done by making the total cost equal
to zero at the point where the marginal cost is equal to zero. Clearly, if c where set lower than
this, there would be a region where the total cost is negative. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst ﬁnd the IZ/K










v + c = IZ/Kno-cost

















The key asset pricing moments we are interested in are ﬁrst and second unconditional moments
for equity and risk free returns. We also consider time-varying means and volatilities.
Table 1 presents the model implications from the baseline calibration as well as empirical
counterparts for a set of unconditional moments. Model results are based on sample moments of
17a very long (40000 years) simulated time series. For unconditional moments, the key ﬁnding is
that the model is able to generate an equity premium of several percentage points with reasonable
volatility for the equity return as well as for the risk free rate. The model’s mean Sharpe ratio
is about one third of the one that is implied in the historic equity premium. Given the higher
adjustment cost curvature for structures relative to equipment and software, as expected structures
have a higher return volatility and a higher risk premium than equipment and software.
The model is able to generate considerable time-variation in conditional risk premiums. Indeed,
the standard deviation of the one-period ahead conditional equity premium is at 4.83%, which is
considerably higher than the standard deviation of the risk free rate at 2.97%. There is a variety
of empirical studies measuring return predictability, with a variety of conclusions. For instance,
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) report R20s of 0.18 and 0.04 for regressions of excess returns
on lagged price-dividend ratios at a one-year horizon for the periods 1947 − 95 and 1871 − 1993,






an estimate of the volatility of the conditional equity premium. Setting R2 =0 .1 this would be
√
0.1 × 0.17 = 5.27%.T h u s ,t h em o d e l ’ sv a l u eo f4.83% is close.











σt (Rt+1)ρt (mt+1,R t+1).
Possibly, return volatility can drive risk premiums, but this doesn’t seem empirically relevant.
According to Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) this is not the case for the US postwar period. Indeed,
they ﬁnd strong negative correlations between conditional means and volatilities. Our model is
consistent with this fact. Indeed, for the baseline calibration the correlation between conditional
means and volatilities is −0.34. This negative correlation seems very robust to parameter changes.
Most standard models cannot replicate this ﬁnding. With CRRA utility and lognormal con-











· σt (Rt+1) · ρt (mt+1,R t+1).5
In the Mehra-Prescott setup, all terms in the equation are roughly constant, with the correla-
tion, ρt (mt+1,R t+1), roughly equal to one. In Campbell and Cochrane’s model,
σt(mt+1)
Etmt+1 displays
considerable variation. However, as is clear from their Figures 4 and 5, conditional means and
volatilities are positively correlated.











ρt (mt+1,R t+1). (6.1)
5The approximation comes from replacing γ · σt (lnC
0/C) by
p
exp[γ2vart (lnC0/C)] − 1.
18Given the volatile conditional means and the negative correlation between conditional means
and volatilities, Sharpe ratios are very volatile. According to Lettau and Ludvigson (2004), for
quarterly data, market implied Sharpe ratios have a mean of 0.39 and a standard deviation of
0.448, which implies a coeﬃcient of variation of 0.448/0.39 = 1.15. In our model, for the baseline
calibration, this ratio equals, 0.26/0.17 = 1.56. That is, considering that our model generates
average Sharpe ratios of roughly 1/3 of the ones implied by the aggregate market, it nevertheless
has the ability to generate considerable volatility in Sharpe ratios
What drives the volatility of the Sharpe ratio? Both parts on the right hand side of equation
6.1 contribute. As shown in Table 1, the market price of risk is moving, but its mean and standard
deviation diﬀer from those of the market’s Sharpe ratio. The mean of the market price of risk is
(obviously) larger, while the volatility is lower. Remember the model structure, given that we have
perfectly correlated shocks, the correlation ρt (mt+1,R t+1) can only be 1 or -1. Clearly, therefore,
ρt (mt+1,R t+1) is switching between values of 1 and -1 as a function of the state of the economy.
To further investigate this regime shifting property, note that if we make the shock process IID
the mean and standard deviation of the Sharpe ratio and the market price of risk are much closer
to each other than in the baseline case with serial correlation (and asymmetric states) as seen in
Table 2. That is to say that the occurrence of a negative (conditional) correlation between the
market return and the stochastic discount factor, and thus a negative Sharpe ratio is much rarer in
the IID case. Table 3 show results for the case with investment speciﬁc technology shocks. While
there are some quantitative diﬀerences, none of our main conclusions are aﬀected. Note that we
did not recalibrate the rest of the rest of the model.
To further illustrate model properties, we show here model implications from feeding through
the investment realizations for the U.S. for the period 1947-2003. Given that investment growth in
our model has only two values, the ﬁt of the driving process is not perfect. Nevertheless, as shown
in Figure 1, the ﬁt is very good, with correlations between the model and the data of 0.78 and
0.71 for equipment and structures respectively. Figure 2 shows that the model’s generated returns
are indeed related to actually realized stock returns, with a correlation of 0.48.F i g u r e 3 s h o w s
conditional moments. The two panels on the left show that conditional volatility is more persistent
(and thus history dependent) than expected returns. The right hand side panel shows the market
price of risk and the market’s Sharpe ratio. Considering the 1990s, through the series of 8 high
realizations in investment growth, expected returns, and Sharpe ratios are declining over time.
The ﬁgure also shows that with a low investment growth realization, the market Sharpe ratio
becomes negative, and thus the conditional correlation ρt (mt+1,R t+1) becomes negative. It is
interesting here to consider again the calibration with IID investment growth to further highlight
19the persistent component driving risk premiums. Figure 3b, presents the realized conditional
moments corresponding to the IID case we presented in Table 2. Here the state of the economy is












the conditional mean becomes even more persistent than the volatility. Only twice in the postwar
period does the market Sharpe ratio become negative. In the 1990s, it is at the 8th successive
realization of a high investment rate that the market Sharpe ratio becomes negative. It then
stays negative for another 3 periods, where investment growth is low. What are the elements
of the state vector that are driving this result? There is a strong negative relationship between
investment/capital ratios and Sharpe ratios, see Table 1 and 2. However, the relationship isn’t
perfect, and thus, investment and capital matter individually.
Finally, Figure 4 compares the model’s risk free rate to the realized returns of short term
Treasuries. While model and data seem to have a similar upward trend through the postwar
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20Table 1
Asset Pricing Implications: Baseline calibration
 R
M                   R
M-R
f Rf Market Price of Risk Sharpe Market  R
E&S        R
E&S-R
f  R
S              R
S-R
f
Mean 3.17% 1.11% 0.25 0.17 1.83% 4.33%
Std 19.55% 2.97% 0.18 0.26 11.23% 25.76%
Std[E(R
M-R




Corr( IKZ , E(R
M-R
f|t)  ) Corr( IKZ , R
f  ) Corr( IKZ , Sharpe  )
E&S 0.15 0.16 -0.86




Real returns 1947-2003 R
M                                 R
M-R
f Rf Sharpe
Mean 8.35% 1.09% 0.49
Std 17.24% 2.07%Table 2
Asset Pricing Implications: IIID case; no serial correlation, no asymmetric states
 R
M                   R
M-R
f Rf Market Price of Risk Sharpe Market  R
E&S          R
E&S-R
f  R
S                 R
S-R
f
Mean 3.11% 1.06% 0.18 0.17 1.79% 4.29%
Std 19.99% 2.55% 0.10 0.12 11.42% 26.13%
Std[E(R
M-R




Corr( IKZ , E(R
M-R
f|t)  ) Corr( IKZ , R
f  ) Corr( IKZ , Sharpe  )
E&S -0.43 -0.88 -0.39




Real returns 1947-2003 R
M                                 R
M-R
f Rf Sharpe
Mean 8.35% 1.09% 0.49
Std 17.24% 2.07%Table 3
Asset Pricing Implications: with shocks to investment technology
 R
M                   R
M-R
f Rf Market Price of Risk Sharpe Market  R
E&S          R
E&S-R
f  R
S                 R
S-R
f
Mean 2.05% 1.65% 0.28 0.13 1.08% 2.79%
Std 16.91% 4.14% 0.17 0.30 9.37% 22.72%
Std[E(R
M-R




Corr( IKZ , E(R
M-R
f|t)  ) Corr( IKZ , R
f  ) Corr( IKZ , Sharpe  )
E&S 0.49 -0.94 0.31




Real returns 1947-2003 R
M                                 R
M-R
f Rf Sharpe
Mean 8.35% 1.09% 0.49
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Excess returns: Conditional mean, 1948-2003









Excess returns: Conditional volatility, 1948-2003









Market Sharpe Ratio and Market Price of Risk, 1948-2003










Excess returns: Conditional mean, 1948-2003









Excess returns: Conditional volatility, 1948-2003












Market Sharpe Ratio and Market Price of Risk, 1948-2003








Risk free rate, 1948-2003 Figure 4 